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Abstract 
Background 
The cognitive restructuring of maladaptive beliefs within many cognitive-behavioural 
psychotherapies typically encourage the client to undertake self-reflection. However, whilst self-
consciousness can aid self-regulation, it is also implicated in a broad range of psychopathology. 
The extent to which self-consciousness is associated with psychological distress is yet to be fully 
determined, however, recent literature suggests that irrational beliefs, as proposed within rational 
emotive behavior theory (REBT) may play an important role.  
Aims 
The aim of the study was to test the mediational effects of self-consciousness, specifically 
reflection and rumination, on the relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological distress. 
Based on past research, it was hypnotized that reflection and rumination would mediate the 
positive relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological distress. We expected irrational 
beliefs to interact with rumination to positively predict psychological distress, and irrational beliefs 
to interact with reflection to negatively predict psychological distress.  
Method 
The present research tested a structural equation model (SEM) in which rumination and reflection 
mediated the relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological distress.  
Results 
Results indicated that rumination mediates the positive relationship between irrational beliefs and 
psychological distress. However, in contrast to our hypotheses, significant mediation did not 
emerge for reflection.  
Conclusion  
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This study is the first to show how irrational beliefs and rumination interact to predict 
psychopathology using advanced statistical techniques. However, future research is needed to 
determine whether similar mediational effects are evident with rational beliefs as opposed to 
irrational beliefs. 
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Mediational Role of Rumination and Reflection on Irrational Beliefs and Distress 
Self-consciousness can be both beneficial and detrimental to psychological well-being. Indeed, 
whilst self-consciousness can aid self-regulation (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002), it is also 
implicated in a broad range of psychopathology (e.g., Ingram, 1990), particularly if self-attention 
increases one’s awareness of personal short-comings (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Self-
consciousness has been found to positively relate to depression (Jones, Papadakis, Hogan, & 
Strauman, 2009), and more broadly, to psychological distress (Panayiotou & Kokkinos, 2006). 
The contrasting findings that self-consciousness seems to relate to both well- and ill-being, is 
thought to indicate that self-consciousness is multidimensional, comprising two theoretically 
distinct constructs; rumination and reflection (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).  
Rumination represents self-attentiveness motivated by threats, losses, or injustices to the 
self. In contrast, reflection is self-attentiveness motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the 
self (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Rumination is considered harmful to psychological well-being 
whilst reflection is beneficial to psychological well-being. Whilst research consistently finds that 
rumination is harmful (e.g., Ciesla & Roberts, 2002; 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 1997; Robinson & Alloy, 2003), conflicting research findings have fueled much 
debate as to whether or not reflection is indeed beneficial for psychological well-being. For 
example, some research has found non-significant longitudinal relationships between reflection 
and negative affect and depression (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Burwell & Shrik, 2007), whilst 
other research indicates little relationship between reflection and ill-being (Joineman, Parrot, & 
Hammersia, 2002). In other research a paradoxical positive relationship with depression and 
suicidal ideation has emerged (Rude, Maestes, & Neff, 2007; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk & Heimberg, 2002; Surrence, Miranda, 
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Marroquin & Chan, 2009; Verhaegen, Joorman, & Khan, 2005). Therefore, the role of reflection 
in psychopathology remains controversial.  
Clearly, reflection has costs and benefits, partially because accurately reflecting on the self 
without rose-tinted glasses may engender a maladaptive view of the self (Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999). It might be that the extent to which reflection is helpful or harmful for psychological well-
being is partially dependent on additional psychological factors, such as individual beliefs, values, 
and attitudes (Takano & Tanno, 2009). Simsek (2013) put forth such a potential psychological 
factor by conceiving of Need for Absolute Truth (NAT), which reflects abstract self-analysis 
aimed at capturing absolute knowledge about the self. NAT cognitions are abstract, in that they 
are overgeneralized, superordinate, and valid in all contexts, and therefore NAT cognitions are 
likely to be deleterious for psychological well-being (Watkins, 2008). This is important because 
Watkins (2008) suggests that reflection could be harmful for well-being if motivated by abstract 
analysis of personal experiences or the self. Indeed, Simsek (2013) found that while reflection was 
positively related to psychological distress in bivariate correlations, the inclusion of NAT and 
rumination in a predictive model showed that reflection was negatively related to psychological 
distress.  
One psychological factor that has sparsely been considered in self-consciousness research 
is irrational beliefs as posited within rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT; Ellis, 1957). Szasz 
(2011) found that greater irrational beliefs predicted greater psychological distress, and that 
irrational beliefs were positively related to reflection and rumination. However, with irrational 
beliefs and reflection held constant, only rumination predicted psychological distress, and 
mediation analyses revealed that the direct effect between irrational beliefs and psychological 
distress became non-significant when rumination and reflection were included in the model. To be 
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clear, only the indirect effect of irrational beliefs on distress through the mediator of rumination 
was statistically significant, therefore, rumination appeared to be the most important mediator 
between irrational beliefs and psychological distress.  
Szasz (2011) does not speculate in detail as to why irrational beliefs might relate to self-
consciousness, other than positing that rumination could be more strongly positively related to 
irrational beliefs due to the negative and self-critical nature of irrational beliefs (Rude et al., 2007; 
Trew & Alden, 2009). By evaluating the nature of irrational beliefs it is possible to more clearly 
understand why irrational beliefs might interact with reflection and rumination to predict 
psychological distress. Specifically, irrational beliefs can be considered as abstract analyses of 
personal experiences and the self, not too dissimilar to NAT. Indeed, since absolute truth is 
impossible to achieve, NAT cognitions could be considered irrational.  In REBT, irrational beliefs 
are considered to be extreme, rigid, and illogical (Dryden, 2009), and are a well-supported risk 
factor for psychological distress (Turner, 2016; see Visla et al., 2016, for a meta-analysis). In 
addition, irrational beliefs can be considered abstract in that they are cross-situational and 
aggregated (Stöber, Tepperwein, & Staak, 2000), superordinate, decontextualized, and 
overgeneralized (Watins, 2008).   
For example, the irrational belief “because I have failed in this task so that means I am a 
complete failure” reflects self-depreciation beliefs as defined within REBT, where the 
consequences of a single event is generalized to the whole self (Artiran, 2015). This self-
depreciation belief is cross-situational and decontextualized (since the self has been labeled and 
therefore being a “failure” pervades all situations), aggregated (since it reflects the whole sum), 
superordinate (since it reflects a generic labeling of the self), and overgeneralized (since the whole 
self has been labeled on the basis of one occurrence). Given the conceptual similarities between 
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irrational beliefs and NAT, one might expect irrational beliefs to be an important construct to 
consider in the relationships between rumination, reflection, and psychological well-being (e.g., 
Szasz, 2011).   
The main aim of the present study is to investigate the mediational effects of rumination 
and reflection on the positive relationship between irrational beliefs and psychopathology. Szasz 
(2011) indicates that irrational beliefs may interact with rumination and reflection to predict 
psychopathology, and therefore we hypothesized that rumination and reflection would mediate the 
positive relationship between irrational beliefs and psychopathology. We expected irrational 
beliefs to interact with rumination to positively predict psychological distress, and irrational beliefs 
to interact with reflection to negatively predict psychological distress. However, given that Szasz 
(2011) found a small positive association between irrational beliefs and reflection, we were 
tentative about our hypotheses concerning reflection.  
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 172 (Mage = 25.9; SDage = 4.59, AgeRange = 18-35; female = 94) 
randomly selected using convenience sampling from Istanbul City in Turkey. Participants were 
from a non-clinical population and voluntarily participated in the study, and formally consented to 
taking part during an initial one-to-one meeting prior to any data collection. The questionnaire 
instructions and answer sheet were read aloud and administration took 20-minutes. 
Measures 
Rumination and reflection. The Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999) was used to measure reflection and rumination. The RRQ comprises 24 items; 
12 for each dimension. Ratings are indicated on a Likert-scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 
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(agree strongly) for each item. The scale was adapted into Turkish using a back-translation 
procedure (Şimşek, 2013). Internal consistency of the scale was found to be .87 in this study. 
Cronbach Alpha for rumination was .84, and .80 for reflection. 
Psychological distress. The Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI), developed by Derogatis, 
1977, 1993) as a shorter version of the The Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R), was used 
in the current study. Of the 90 items distributed to the 9 factors of SCL-90-R, 53 items with the 
highest factor loading were chosen. The instrument consisting of nine subscales (somatization, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety disorders, hostility, 
phobic anxiety, paranoid ideations, psychoticism) has been adapted into Turkish (Şahin & Durak, 
1994). The participants were asked to reply on a five-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 5 (extremely). The reliability coefficients of the subscales were between .71 and .85. 
Irrational beliefs. The Attitudes and Beliefs Scale-2 (ABS-2; DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Exner, & 
Robin, 1998; DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Gorman, Robin, 2017) was used to determine rational and 
irrational beliefs. The ABS-2 is a 76-item scale with good internal consistency (ranging from .85 
to .91; Macavei, 2002). It measures both four irrational processes proposed by Ellis (i.e., 
demandingness, catastrophising, low frustration tolerance, and self – global evaluation) and the 
content of the beliefs (i.e., comfort, approval, achievement). Although it is constructed with a 
4x3x2 subscale matrix, many researchers do not support this factor structure (Fulop, 2007). The 
ABS-2 is widely used and is theoretically appropriate to REBT.  
Analytic Strategy 
The model proposed in the current investigation was tested using structural equation 
modeling (SEM) using LISREL 8.80 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2001) with the Maximum Likelihood 
estimation method. A two-stage approach was used to test the proposed SEM. That is, the 
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measurement model was tested before the test of the SEM. Trait rational belief (RaBel) scores 
were statistically controlled for, since the aim of the present research is to test the effects of 
irrational beliefs (IrrBel) on the other target variables without the effects of participants’ rational 
beliefs. Statistical control of RaBel was achieved by adding paths from this latent variable to the 
indicators of other latent variables (See Figure 1), while the covariance of this latent variable with 
other latent variables was constrained to be zero (Johnson, Rosen, & Djurdjevic, 2011; Williams 
& Anderson, 1994). Additionally, the variance of RaBel latent variable was set to 1.00 in order to 
achieve identification. This procedure was used both in the tests of measurement and SEMs.  
The mediation hypothesis was tested by the calculation of indirect effects produced by the 
LISREL program. The bootstrapping procedure suggested by Shrout and Bolger (2002) was also 
used as it has been shown to be the most effective way of testing mediation (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Brown, Wang, & Hoffman, 2002). This method is based on testing the significance of 
the indirect paths from the independent variable (IrrBel) to mediator(s) (reflection and rumination) 
and from the mediator(s) to dependent variable (psychopathology). Bootstrapping produces a large 
number of samples from the dataset and uses them to obtain estimates of the standard errors. The 
confidence interval of these standard errors is considered when determining the significance of 
indirect effects. An indirect effect is statistically significant if the 95% confidence interval does 
not contain zero. 
Results 
Test of the Measurement Model 
We tested alternative measurement models using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
understand whether observed variables were reliable indicators of their underlying latent variables. 
Given the reported measurement problems with the ABS-2 (Hyland, 2014), we used alternative 
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indicators for both RaBel and IrrBel. The original four factors of the ABS-2 (awfulizing, low 
frustration tolerance, demandingness, and self-depreciation) were used as indicators of RaBel and 
IrrBel in the first measurement model (Figure 1a). In the second measurement model three parcels 
were created for both (Figure 1b). The aim of using an item parceling technique was to 
form multiple groups of items selected at random and then use their sum scores as indicators 
of the latent constructs. Given that there is no such problematic issue in the other measures used 
in the present study, the rest of the measurement model was not changed. Since reflection and 
rumination sub-scales of the RSQ are one-dimensional, we also created parcels for these latent 
variables in order to achieve statistical control of the measurement error. Depression and anxiety 
sub-scale scores of the BSI were used to define psychopathology latent variables. As a result of 
such a procedure, we tested two models in which only the latent variables of IrrBel and RaBel are 
differentiated (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Measurement models for the present study.  
Rumination_Figure_1.docx 
 
Means, standard deviations and correlations among the observed variables are represented in 
Table 1. All skewness and kurtosis values were less than 3, ranging from -.01 to 1.49 for 
skewness and from -.72 to 2.83 for kurtosis, indicating no crucial problem in terms of normality 
assumption.  
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Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of observed variables 
Table 1.docx 
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A test of the measurement model without the effects of IrrBel resulted in relatively 
acceptable goodness of fit statistics: c2(93, N = 172) = 193.45, p < .05; IFI = .93; CFI = .93; SRMR 
= .071; RMSEA = .079 (90% confidence interval for RMSEA = .064-.095). The measurement 
model was again tested, this time, by considering RaBel as a control variable and produced an 
acceptable fit to the data: c2(84, N = 172) = 157.01, p < .05; IFI = .95; CFI = .95; SRMR = .051; 
RMSEA = .071 (90% confidence interval for RMSEA = 0.054-0.088). A chi-square difference test 
(36.44, 9: p < .01) clearly showed that the second measurement model with the control variable 
was better than the first. These findings were deemed to be a support for the superiority of the 
model with the effects of RaBel. According to the results of this measurement model, the loadings 
of the IrrBel to the indicators of other latent variables ranged from .02 to .20, with the largest 
values for the two indicators of IrrBel and the second parcel of reflection (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Factor Loadings for the Measurement Model: Completely Standardized Solution 
Table 2.docx 
Rumination_Figure_2.docx 
Figure 2. Standardized parameter estimates for the proposed model.  
 
The correlations among the constructs with the effects of RaBel were calculated and are 
presented in Table 3. The correlations among the latent constructs were relatively strong with the 
exception of a weak, though statistically significant, positive latent correlation between reflection 
and psychopathology.  
Table 3 
Correlations of the Latent Constructs 
Table 3.docx 
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Test of the Structural Models 
A test of the proposed structural model resulted in acceptable goodness of fit statistics: 
c2(85, N = 172) = 172.66, p < .05; IFI = .94; CFI = .94; SRMR = .066; RMSEA = .078 (90% 
confidence interval for RMSEA = .061-.094). These results showed that the proposed model 
accounted for the data well. Standardized parameter estimates for the paths in the proposed model 
are represented in Figure 3. It is clear from Figure 3, the effects of IrrBel on psychopathology is 
mediated by rumination but not by reflection where the path from reflection to psychopathology 
was not statistically significant. On the other hand, the paths from IrrBel to rumination and from 
rumination to psychopathology are strong and statistically significant.   
The indirect effect of IrrBel on psychopathology through mediators was shown to be 
significant by LISREL estimates (.29, SE = .06, p < .01). An additional test of the statistical 
significance of the indirect effect was achieved by a bootstrap procedure. The bootstrapping 
procedure tests whether or not this indirect pathway is significantly different from zero. Significant 
mediation is indicated when the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval (CI) do not 
include zero. Using 2000 samples produced from the data, the bootstrapping procedure results 
showed that the CI did not include zero (95% CI = .325 to .767), thus indicating the statistical 
significance of the indirect effect in the proposed model. Finally, in the model 33% of the variance 
was accounted for by self-rumination in psychopathology while irrational beliefs accounted for 
27% of the variance in self-rumination and 16% of the variance in self-reflection.   
It should be noted here that we also tested an alternative model in which the effect of RaBel 
on psychopathology was mediated by the same mediators, namely rumination and reflection. In 
this model, we used IrrBel as the control variable. In sum, the roles of IrrBel and RaBel were 
changed in this alternative model. The results of this alternative model also resulted in acceptable 
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goodness of fit statistics: c2(85, N = 172) = 168.69, p < .05; IFI = .94; CFI = .94; SRMR = .063; 
RMSEA = .076 (90% confidence interval for RMSEA = .059-.093). However, the paths from 
RaBel to both rumination and reflection were not statistically significant (Figure 3) in addition to 
the nonsignificant path from reflection to psychopathology.   
Discussion 
The current study examined the mediational effects of reflection and rumination on the 
relationship between irrational beliefs and psychopathology. The present study expands previous 
research on rumination and reflection by including irrational beliefs in a structural model. The 
results of the data analysis revealed that the positive relationship between irrational beliefs and 
psychopathology was mediated by rumination, but not by reflection. In addition, there were 
positive associations between irrational beliefs and rumination, and between rumination and 
psychopathology. This study is the first to show how irrational beliefs and rumination interact to 
predict psychopathology using advanced statistical techniques.  
There are numerous studies suggesting how cognitive-behavioural therapies (including 
REBT) can reduce rumination (Hutchinson & Chapman, 2005; Purohit & Nayak, 2003), but there 
is sparse research exploring how rumination-focused interventions may assist REBT treatment 
applications particularly during the disputation of irrational beliefs. Despite the findings of the 
current study, the mediational role of reflection on the relationship between irrational beliefs and 
psychopathology remains unclear due to scarce research. We were tentative in our hypotheses 
regarding reflection due to an ongoing debate in the literature that propagates controversial views 
on self-reflectiveness.  Kaufman and Libby (2012) discuss the findings of Wheeler, Morrison, 
DeMarree, and Petty (2008) and suggested that self-reflectiveness is a type of rumination and 
therefore and found that increased internal state awareness decreased the magnitude of the prime-
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to-behavior effect, whereas increased self-reflectiveness amplified the effect. In our research, we 
have found similar results to Szasz (2011), Thomsen, Jensen, Jensen, Mehlsen, Pedersen and 
Zachariae (2013) and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000), in that rumination, but not reflection, is related to 
psychological ill-being. That is, the findings of the present study do not support the idea that 
reflection has a significant role in the relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological 
distress.  
Rumination is defined as repetitive negatively self-centered thoughts, and coping with 
negative mood that involves self-focused attention (Martin & Tesser, 1996, Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Some therapeutic applications such as Meta Cognitive Therapy 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004) and Rumination Focused Cognitive Behavior Therapy (RFCBT; 
Watkins, 2018) focus on rumination alone in sessions. One experimental research study applying 
RFCBT (Watkins, Scott, Wingrove, Rimes, Bathurst, & Steiner, 2006) found that treatment 
focused on rumination produced significant improvements in depressive symptoms and co-morbid 
disorders. Indeed, research concerning depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
shows that rumination is associated with psychopathological symptoms and distress (Aldao, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweitzer, 2010, Chan, ho, Tedechi & Leung, 2011; Rinaldis, Pakenham, 
Lynch, & Aitken, 2009).  
The current study outcomes indicate that rumination plays an important mediational role 
in the positive relationship between irrational beliefs and psychopathology. In CBTs (including 
REBT) inappropriately focusing on cognition (e.g., analytical self-focus) may cause rumination 
and therefore may produce emotional distress (Rawal, Williams, & Park, 2011). Therefore, the 
discovery of irrational beliefs by clients should be supplemented with therapeutic guidance on 
rumination to best help clients to dispute dysfunctional cognitions.  When applying REBT it is 
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unavoidable that clients are oriented towards self-focused thoughts (e.g., irrational beliefs, 
automatic thoughts, core beliefs) because this is part of the therapeutic process.  Therefore clients 
may occasionally ruminate on their irrational beliefs in one-to-one sessions. Helping clients to 
recognize and reduce their rumination, in favor of reflection, may help them to dispute irrational 
beliefs and harness rational beliefs. That is, by working on both what (irrational beliefs) and how 
(the way of ruminating) clients think, may help them to more effectively apply REBT to alleviate 
their psychological distress.  
In addition to the mediational analyses conducted in the present study, the correlational 
findings indicate a positive relationship between rumination and reflection (even though reflection 
has no role in the model). In addition, correlational findings indicate that whilst there is a 
relationship between reflection and psychopathology, the strength of the association is weaker than 
the relationship between rumination and psychopathology. In other words, reflection might not be 
as maladaptive as rumination, but may still be related to some psychopathology, which supports 
some past research (Thomsen et al., 2013). However, considering irrational beliefs, the results may 
help to distinguish rumination from reflection in the context of CBT whereby reflection is not as 
important as rumination when considering how irrational beliefs lead to symptoms of 
psychological distress. Since irrational beliefs are strongly related to neuroticism (Ghumman & 
Shoaib, 2013; Najafi, 2016) the outcomes of this study may support the idea that rumination is 
rooted in neuroticism, whereby reflection is rooted in openness to experience (Silvia, Eichstaedt, 
& Phillips, 2005). The findings of the present study are similar to Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) 
and Şimşek’s (2013) findings, but in contrast some previous research, suggests that reflection is 
not associated with distress (Boyraz & Efstathiou, 2011; Jones, Papakadi, Hogan, & Strauman, 
2009). According to Vassilopoulos (2008) there are two modes of self-focus: active-analytic self-
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focus (called rumination) and experiential self-focus. While the former does not relieve social 
anxiety, the latter is associated with positive thoughts and decreased anxiety. As part of REBT it 
may be important for clients to engage self-reflection in the experiential form in the recognition 
and disputation of irrational beliefs. This may decrease distress related to rumination, and also 
facilitate the disputation process important for the treatment of clients using the REBT approach.  
In our structural model, participants’ rational beliefs (RaBel) were statistically controlled 
for, but future research may wish to re-investigate the mediational roles of rumination and 
reflection on the relationship between rational beliefs (rather than irrational beliefs) and 
psychopathology. In this research we have tested the model with using rational beliefs (and 
controlling irrational beliefs) and psychopathology however according to our results, in the 
Rational Beliefs’ model (RaBel), rumination and reflection variables do not play a mediation role 
between Rational Beliefs (RaBel) and Psychopathology (Anxiety and Depression) variables.  
Assuming that the REBT concept of unconditional self-acceptance (rational belief) may 
involve self-reflection while depreciation beliefs (irrational belief) are more likely to be linked 
with rumination, we can state that this current study is limited to conclusions concerning irrational 
beliefs only. Research concerning rational beliefs is necessary to reach a clearer conclusion 
because outcomes of the correlation analysis indicated that there is little relationship between 
rational beliefs and psychological distress. The current study does not suggest that rational beliefs 
play a role in psychopathology. This result is inconsistent with some research (e.g., DiGuiseppe et 
al., 2017), that found rational beliefs to be correlated with psychopathology. However, research 
does indicate that Irrational beliefs are important cognitive variables in Post-Traumatic Stress 
(PTS) symptoms, while only rational acceptance beliefs seem to have only a protective role in the 
emergence of PTS symptoms (Hyland, Adamson, Shevlin, & Boduszek, 2013). Another 
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explanation of why the RaBel model did not predict psychopathology is that rational beliefs are 
more likely to be associated with positive well-being variables such as happiness and optimism 
(Oltean, Hyland, Vallieres & David, 2018), rather than ill-being variables. 
There are some limitations in the present study that if addressed would strengthen the 
findings. First, the sample size is small therefore the results cannot be generalized more broadly. 
Second, since the sample is drawn from a non-clinical population, it is not known whether the 
findings can translate into clinical populations. Therefore, longitudinal research is needed in a 
larger and more clinical sample. 
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Figure 1. Measurement models for the present study.  
Notes: RaBel = Rational beliefs, IrrBel = Irrational Beliefs, Rum = Rumination, Ref = Reflection, AW = 
Awfulizing, LFT = Low frustration tolerance, DEM = Demandingness, SD = Self-depreciation, IRR1-IRR4 = 
Parcels for the irrational beliefs measure, RAS1-RAS4= Parcels for the rational beliefs measure, RUM1-
RUM4 = Parcels for the rumination measure, REF1-REF4 = Parcels for the reflection measure, DEP = 
Depression, ANX = Anxiety. 
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Figure 2. Standardized parameter estimates for the proposed model.  
Notes: N = 172; RaBel = Rational beliefs, IrrBel = Irrational Beliefs, Rum = Rumination, Ref = Reflection, 
IRR1-IRR3 = Parcels for the irrational beliefs measure, RAS1-RAS3 = Parcels for the rational beliefs 
measure, RUM1-RUM4 = Parcels for the rumination measure, REF1-REF4 = Parcels for the reflection 
measure, DEP = Depression, ANX = Anxiety; Factor loadings higher than .16 are statistically significant at 
p = .05.  
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Figure 3. Standardized parameter estimates for the alternative model.  
Notes: N = 172; RaBel = Rational beliefs, IrrBel = Irrational Beliefs, Rum = Rumination, Ref = Reflection, 
IRR1-IRR3 = Parcels for the irrational beliefs measure, RAS1-RAS3 = Parcels for the rational beliefs 
measure, RUM1-RUM4 = Parcels for the rumination measure, REF1-REF4 = Parcels for the reflection 
measure, DEP = Depression, ANX = Anxiety; Factor loadings higher than .16 are statistically significant at 
p = .05.  
 
 
 
